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Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of governance on capital flight by bundling and unbundling 
governance. The empirical evidence is based on 37 African countries for the period 1996-
2010 and the Generalised Method of Moments. Governance is bundled by principal 
component analysis, namely: (i) political governance from political stability and ‘voice and 
accountability’; (ii) economic governance from government effectiveness and regulation 
quality and (iii) institutional governance from corruption-control and the rule of law. The 
following findings are established.  (i) Political stability and ‘voice and accountability’ reduce 
capital flight while the collective effect of political governance is not significant. (ii) 
Economic governance increases capital flight whereas the individual effects of regulation 
quality and government effectiveness are not significant. (iii) Corruption-control and 
institutional governance negatively affect capital flight whereas the impact of the rule of law 
is not significant. (iv) Taken together, Corruption-control is the most effective governance 
weapon in the fight against capital flight. (v) Priority in the Washington Consensus is more 
effective at fighting capital flight compared to the Beijing Model. Policy implications are 
discussed. 
JEL Classification: C50; E62; F34; O55; P37 
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1. Introduction  
 Capital flight which is a consequence of the offshore financial economy is 
fundamentally traceable to poor governance (see Christensen, 2011; Gankou et al., 2016). 
Notwithstanding the evolving stream of research on governance (Musila & Sigué, 2010; 
Kangoye, 2013) and capital flight (Mpenya et al., 2016; Ndiaye & Siri, 2016), the literature 
remains unclear about how governance affects capital flight. Against this backdrop, the 
purpose of this study is to present a comprehensive assessment of the governance-‘capital 
flight’ nexus. For this purpose, we bundle and unbundle six governance indicators. The 
motivation for bundling governance indicators builds on evolving paradigms in the 
conception, definition and measurement of governance (see Asongu, 2016). For instance, it is 
inappropriate to employ the term political governance unless the variable underlying the term 
is a composite measurement of ‘voice and accountability’ and political stability/non-violence.  
 The inquiry is focused on Africa for two main reasons. First, the continent as a 
principal source of capital flight has experienced substantial levels of capital outflows over 
the past decades (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a). According to the narrative, thirty-three Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries lost about 814 billion US Dollars (in constant of 2010 US 
Dollar) during the period 1970-2010 (see Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a). This amount lost to 
the flight of capital surpasses official development assistance and foreign direct investment of 
respectively 659 and 306 billion US Dollars by the same countries in the sub-region during 
the same period. Shortage in financing has been documented to be the main cause of poverty 
and underdevelopment in Africa (see Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Boyce & Ndikumana, 
2012a; Darley, 2012). The shortage of finance has hindered the socio-economic investment 
needed to alleviate extreme poverty. Accordingly, a recent report on attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the World Bank has revealed that extreme 
poverty has been diminishing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa, where 
45 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were substantially off-track from attaining the 
MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015).   
 Second, contemporary African development literature on capital flight has failed to 
substantially capture the role of institutions in fighting the scourge. Accordingly, recent 
literature has focused on the lessons from case studies on the causes and consequences of 
capital flight (Ndikumana, 2016), inter alia: the relationship between capital flight and fiscal 
policy (Muchai & Muchai, 2016); determinants of capital flight in Ethiopia (Geda & Yimer, 
2016) and Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa  &  Rakotomanana, 2016); trade misinvoicing and 
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capital flight in Zimbabwe (Kwaramba et al., 2016); the nexus between capital flight and 
natural resources in Cameroon (Mpenya et al., 2016); public social spending and capital flight 
in Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016) and linkages between capital flight and tax revenue 
in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016). 
  In the light of the above, this study complements the literature by investigating the 
incidence of governance on capital flight with particular emphasis on the bundling and 
unbundling of institutions. It is of policy relevance to use composite governance indicators 
because concepts of governance have been used in the literature without an  all-inclusive 
measurement. For example, Kangoye (2013) has used ‘corruption-control’ as ‘governance’. 
Moreover, the concepts of institutional governance, economic governance and political 
governance have been employed in the literature without statistical validity (Kaufmann et al., 
2007ab; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007ab). We argue that it is inappropriate to employ the term 
‘economic governance’ unless it translates an indicator that is composed of government 
effectiveness and regulation quality. We address this conceptual shortcoming by using nine 
bundled and unbundled governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice & 
accountability and political stability/no violence); economic governance (government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance (corruption-control and the 
rule of law). 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 clarifies the concepts of 
governance and covers the theoretical underpinnings. The data and methodology are 
described in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the empirical results and related argument.  
Section 5 concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Clarification of governance concepts and theoretical underpinnings   
2.1 Clarification of concepts  
This section is organised into two strands: the first clarifies the concepts of governance while 
the second discusses the theoretical underpinnings. A multitude of definitions have been 
proposed to clarify the concept of governance. We accord with Asongu (2016) in discussing 
four definitions from recent literature. First, governance has been defined by Dixit (2009) as  
‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity 
and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’1 (p.5). Second, 
                                                          
1
 Emphasis on original.  
5 
 
consistent with Fukuyama (2013), the governance concept can be consolidated with the 
comprehension of four main approaches to ‘state quality’, namely: capacity indicators that 
embody resource levels and professionalism, output indicators and political measures. Third, 
according to Tusalem (2015), governance is a phenomenon that encompasses: corruption, 
bureaucratic effectiveness, regulation quality and the rule of law. Fourth, notwithstanding this 
plethora of definitions, the most popular indicators in the literature are from Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). These include: (i) ‘political governance’ which is the election and replacement of 
political leaders (proxied with political stability/no violence and voice and accountability); (ii) 
‘institutional governance’ which is the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that 
govern interactions between them (measured with corruption-control and the rule of law); and 
(iii) ‘economic governance’, which is defined as the formulation and implementation of 
policies that deliver public commodities (measured with  government effectiveness and 
regulation quality).  
 In spite of criticisms on the quality of indicators used by Kaufmann et al. (2010), in 
scholarly circles, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have been promptly responding to the 
critics with rebuttals in order to confirm the quality of the World Bank indicators. One of the 
most interesting debates has been with Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. For lack of space, 
the interested reader is invited to consult the main streams underlying the debate, namely: 
measures and mechanisms (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a); a reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a); a 
defense (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007b) and a rejoinder (Kaufmann et al., 2007b).  
 
2.2 Governance and capital flight  
 This section comprises three main strands, notably: the relationship between political 
governance and capital flight, the connection between economic governance and capital flight 
and the relationship between institutional governance and capital flight.  
 In the first strand on political governance, the political environment has been 
documented to be an important factor influencing capital flight because it is related to the 
loss/damage of assets as well as improvements in insurance premiums that are investment-
related (see Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana et al., 2015). When such features 
are associated with political stability and violence, it is very probable that investors are 
prompted to transfer their capital to environments with lower risks of investment. Moreover, 
if portfolio investors are persuaded that some national political institutions (e.g. executive 
accountability and competitive elections) are not conducive avenues for economic 
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performance, they are more likely to withdraw their funds and  transfer them to those 
countries where political institutions are credible and stable. In essence, a number of political 
characteristics shape the performance of foreign markets and security of claims related to 
foreign ownership (Lensink et al., 2000; Le & Zak, 2006). For instance, with respect to 
foreign direct investment (FDI): in which an investor controls/own assets in a receiving 
nation, political risk could be negative on economic growth and long term investment.  
          In the light of the above, investors respond to political events they find unfavourable to 
their returns by disinvesting. Hence, direct impacts of political features such as accountability, 
democracy, political instability affect the amount of capital inflows into an economy. In 
essence, executives that are unaccountable could produce investment policies that are 
unpredictable, which affects capital flight.  
 As concerns the second strand, poor economic governance could produce an uncertain 
economic outlook that discourages investors from investing within an economy. This is 
essentially because investors have been documented to prefer investing in less uncertain 
economic climates (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016). In essence, bad 
economic governance can inflict considerable economic damages that influence investors’ 
concern about asset valuation as well as confidence due to poor economic outlook. Thereby, 
from an investor’s point of view, money and assets can quickly flow-out of a country in the 
face of bad governance. Poor economic governance can stifle macroeconomic performance, 
hence, discouraging investors because macroeconomic prospects are bleak.  
 From the government’s perspective, bad economic governance can lead to capital 
flight if the formulation and implementation of policies designed to deliver public 
commodities are masterly tailored to siphon and deposit stolen funds in tax havens. This 
implies that in the absence of government effectiveness and regulation quality, government 
officials are more likely to devise policies that enable them to siphon funds and deposit them 
in tax havens.  
 In the third strand on institutional governance and capital flight, we argue that 
corruption-control and the rule of law influence both investors’ confidence in an economy as 
well as the ability of government officials to siphon and deposit stolen funds abroad. 
Accordingly, investors would not put their money in an economy in which the respect of the 
rule of law is not optimal. In essence, they are less likely to invest if, in their opinion 
predation by the State can weaken overall economic performance, irrespective of whether 
they are directly affected by such predation. Respect of the rule of law ensures better 
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protection of property rights and guarantees that foreigners do not need to be afraid of being 
expropriated of their invested assets. Such expropriation affects capital flight and discourages 
foreign investment. Moreover, countries with corrupt executives may not fully commit to 
respecting the ownership rights of investors.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study investigates a panel of 37 African countries with data from 1996 to 2010. 
There are two main sources to the data, namely: African Development Indicators of the World 
Bank and capital flight measurements from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). The study is for 
the period 1996-2010 because of data availability constraints. Accordingly, whereas good 
governance indicators from the World Bank are only available from 1996, the end year of the 
capital flight indicator is 2010. 
 The capital flight outcome variable denotes capital flows between one country and the 
rest of the world that are unrecorded. The measurement of such flows begins from foreign 
exchange inflows that are considered in the Balance of Payments of a country, such that 
missing money (the variation between recorded inflows and outflows that are unrecorded) is 
documented in terms of ‘net errors and omissions’. The highlighted conception and definition 
of capital flight has been substantially considered in recent capital flight literature (Weeks, 
2015; Efobi & Asongu, 2016). 
 The principal shortcoming in the capital flight measure is the fact that it is not 
comparable with other indicators, since, it is disclosed in constant 2010 US Dollar terms. In 
accordance with Asongu (2014), the concern is tackled by: (i) transforming current GDP into 
constant 2010 terms; (ii) dividing the corresponding value by 1 000 000 to obtain a ‘GDP 
constant of 2010 USD (in millions) and (iii) finally dividing the capital flight data by the 
‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions). Eventually, a capital flight measurement that is 
comparable with other indicators is obtained (see Appendix 2). 
 The six explanatory governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are bundled in 
Section 3.1 by means of principal component analysis (PCA).  The bundling exercise 
produces: (i) political governance (composed of political stability/non violence and voice & 
accountability); (ii) economic governance (consisting of government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance (an embodiment of corruption-control 
and the rule of law). The six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) have been 
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used (though unbundled) in recent governance literature (see Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 
2015; Andrés et al., 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015). 
 In order to avoid variable omission bias, we control for the following: the lagged 
dependent variable, trade openness, GDP growth, inflation, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and public investment. There control variables have been substantially documented in the 
literature of capital flight (see Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; 
Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013, 2015). We expect the lagged values of capital flight to positively 
affect future values of capital flight in order to ascertain the capital flight trap. Economic  
prosperity in terms of economic growth can either increase or decrease capital flight 
depending on if the corresponding growth is either broad-based or concentrated within a few 
sectors of the economy (e.g. like heavy resource industries). On the one hand, economic 
growth that is broad-base could decrease capital flight because it confers a positive investment 
outlook. On the other hand, when growth is driven by a few extractive industries, it is most 
likely to be associated with capital flight. Very high inflation positively affects capital flight 
because, for the most part, it is linked to a negative investment/economic outlook and/or 
uncertainty in the return to investment. The intuition is in accordance with established 
evidence that investors prefer strategies of investment that are less ambiguous (Kelsey & Le 
Roux, 2016; Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016). Anticipated signs from FDI and trade are difficult to 
predict ex-ante because these signs are contingent on whether FDI is broad-based or restricted 
to a few economic sectors. Hence, this discourse is broadly in line with the previous narrative 
on economic growth. However, it is very probable  that financial and trade globalisations are 
linked to capital flight because of, inter alia, opportunities for accounting practises like 
transfer mispricing (see Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Ndikumana & Sarr, 2016).   
 Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively present the definition of 
variables (with corresponding sources), the summary statistics and correlation matrix.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 We employ the PCA in order to bundle government quality variables from Kaufmann 
et al. (2010) into three composite measurements, namely: political, institutional and economic 
governances. The PCA approach to bundling governance has been recently documented in 
African governance literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). It is a technique that consists 
of reducing a set of highly correlated indicators into an uncorrelated set of small variables 
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known as principal components (PCs).  The derived PCs articulate a substantial variation or 
information from the original dataset.   
 Within the underlying PCA framework, the six indicators of good governance are 
reduced to political governance, economic governance and institutional governance.  Political 
governance (a composition of political stability and voice & accountability) is the election and 
replacement of political leaders. Economic governance (consisting of government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) is the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities. Institutional governance (entailing corruption-control and the rule 
of law) is the respect by citizens and the State of institutions that govern interactions between 
them.   
 The selection of PCs is based on the Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion. These 
authors have recommended that only common factors that have an eigenvalue which is higher 
than the mean or one should be retained. As shown in Table 1, political governance (Polgov) 
which represents about 83.50% of information from ‘voice and accountability’ and political 
stability has an eigenvalue of 1.671, economic governance (Ecogov) which reflects about 
93.90% of information from government effectiveness and regulation quality has an 
eigenvalue of 1.878 while institutional governance (Instgov) that represents about 93.00% of 
information from corruption-control and the rule of law has an eigenvalue of 1.861.  
 It is important to note that eigenvalues reflect eigenvectors associated with the PCs. 
For instance, the first eigenvector of a correlation matrix shows the maximum variance in the 
data. The eigenvector is the first PC. Hence, a PC provides a new orthogonal basis for 
uncorrelated data points and each PC is a linear combination of original indicators that have 
coordinates in the fundamental basis. The maximum variance can also be understood as 
common information that is contained in constituents of the PC.  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Composite Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
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Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 It is important to engage some pertinent issues that may arise with regards to 
regressors that are obtained from initial regressions. In essence, as recently documented by 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a), issues are associated with the consistency and efficiency of 
estimates as well as the validity of associated inferences. According to Pagan (1984, p.242), 
whereas two-step estimators are consistent and efficient, only few valid inferences can be 
made.  This caution is an accordance with a recent strand of literature pertaining to the 
concerns: Westerlund and Urbain (2013a); Ba and Ng (2006); McKenzie and McAleer (1997) 
and Oxley and McAleer (1993).  
 Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have documented issues on the inferential 
quality of variables that are derived from PCA. The authors have built on a stream of previous 
studies on the subject (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; 
Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012) to conclude that normal inferences are possible with PC-
augmented regressors, provided that the estimated parameters converge to their real values at 
the rate NT , (with T being the number of time series and N denoting cross-section 
observations).  They have gone further to clarify that, in order for the suggested convergence 
to take place, N and T need to be sufficiently large. But there is no indication as to how ‘large 
is large’. Regarding the specific context of this paper, we are confronted with two major 
issues. On the one hand, N cannot be increased further because we are engaging all the 37 
countries for which capital flight is available. On the other hand, T can only be situated 
between 1996 and 2010 because: good governance indicators only date from 1996 and capital 
flight data ends in 2010. In a summary, we argue that valid inferences are feasible because 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) have recently established valid inferences using governance 
indicators that are lower in terms of T and N.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 The choice of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) empirical strategy is 
motivated by at least five factors: whereas the first-two are fundamental requirements, the 
last-three are related advantages. The strategy enables the study to account for the capital 
flight trap given that, the criterion for persistence in capital flight is fulfilled. In essence, the 
correlation between capital flight and its first lag is 0.867, which is above 0.800 considered as 
the criterion needed to ascertain persistence in the outcome variable. The T(or 5)<N(or 37) 
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criterion for the use of the GMM estimation approach is met since the number of time series 
in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections. The estimation approach 
controls for endogeneity in all regressors by employing instrumented regressors as well as 
controlling for time invariant omitted variables. Biases in the difference GMM approach are 
handled by the system GMM version. Specifications also take cross-country differences into 
account.  
 It is for the fourth reason above that the system GMM estimator (from Arellano & 
Bond, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) has been documented by Bond et al. (2001, pp.3-4) to 
have better properties than the difference estimator (from Arellano & Bond, 1991). The 
system approach adopted by this study is the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) which instead of employing differences uses forward orthogonal deviations. 
This extension has better properties because it has been established to limit instrument 
proliferation and/or avoid over-identification (see Baltagi, 2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006). A 
two-step specification is chosen because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the 
one-step approach is consistent with homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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Where: tiCap ,  
is capital flight of country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
 represents the 
coefficient of autoregression;  Gov , denotes governance which may be political, economic or 
institutional; W  is the vector of control variables  (Trade, Growth, Inflation, FDI and Public 
Investment),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the 
error term. 
 
3.2.3 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions  
 It is important to engage exclusion restrictions and identification. Consistent with 
recent studies (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), all 
independent variables are suspected endogenous or predetermined whereas the time-invariant 
omitted variables are acknowledged as strictly exogenous. This is essentially because it is not 
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feasible for time-invariant omitted variables to become endogenous in first-difference (see 
Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the approach for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ 
while the gmmstyle is used  for suspected endogenous  variables.  
 In order to address the concern of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as 
instruments for forward differenced variables. Helmet transformations are also employed for 
the regressors in order to eliminate fixed effects that could affect the investigated nexuses 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006). Such transformations entail the use of 
forward mean-differencing of the indicators: contrary to the process of subtracting previous 
observations from present one (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104), the average of all future 
observations is deducted from the indicators. This transformation ensures orthogonal or 
parallel conditions between lagged values and forward-differenced variables. Irrespective of 
the number of lags, the loss of data is minimised by computing the underlying transformation 
for all observations with the exception of the last observation in cross sections: “And because 
lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman 
(2009b, p. 104). 
 In view of the above, time invariant omitted variables influence capital flight 
exclusively via the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. Moreover, the 
statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the validity of instruments. In essence, for the time invariant variables to 
explain capital flight exclusively through the suspected endogenous variables, the alternative 
hypothesis of the test should be rejected. It is important to note that while in a standard 
instrumental variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments do not elucidate the 
outcome variable beyond suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016c), with the GMM approach that uses forward orthogonal deviations, the 
information criterion that is employed to assess whether time invariant omitted variables 
exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT. Therefore in the light of these clarifications, in the 
reported findings below, the hypothesis of exclusion restriction is validated if the null 
hypothesis of the DHT associated with IV(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 respectively present findings corresponding to political 
governance, economic governance and institutional governance. Four principal information 
criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations
2
. The following findings can be established for Table 2. Political stability and 
‘voice and accountability’ reduce capital flight while the effect of political governance is not 
significant.  
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on the nexus between 
economic governance and capital flight. Whereas regulation quality positively affects capital 
flight, the corresponding specification is not valid because of invalid instruments. Economic 
governance increases capital flight whereas the effect of government effectiveness is not 
significant.  
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on the nexus between 
institutional governance and capital flight. Corruption-control and institutional governance 
negatively affect capital flight whereas the impact of the rule of law is not significant. For all 
three tables, most of the significant control variables have anticipated signs and the capital 
flight trap is confirmed because past capital flight positively affects future capital flight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9) 
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Table 2: Capital flight and political governance  
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Political Stability Voice and Accountability Political Governance 
       
Constant  4.895*** 5.377*** 5.091*** 4.769*** 4.873*** 4.817*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight (-1) 0.494*** 0.516*** 0.492*** 0.569*** 0.504*** 0.581*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability    -0.115* -0.047* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.077) (0.077)     
Voice & Accountability  --- --- 0.044 -0.131* --- --- 
   (0.785) (0.063)   
Political Governance  --- --- --- --- -0.049 -0.036 
     (0.467) (0.304) 
Trade Openness  0.0002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.001 
 (0.868) (0.340) (0.485) (0.554) (0.919) (0.216) 
GDP growth  0.005 -0.014** 0.011 -0.015*** 0.011 -0.026*** 
 (0.510) (0.027) (0.231) (0.003) (0.262) (0.000) 
Inflation  --- 0.003*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.016*** --- -0.014*** --- -0.019*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Public Investment  --- -0.005 --- -0.009 --- -0.032** 
  (0.562)  (0.456)  (0.015) 
       
AR(1) (0.153) (0.042) (0.202) (0.083) (0.194) (0.064) 
AR(2) (0.299) (0.471) (0.458) (0.686) (0.421) (0.936) 
Sargan OIR (0.613) (0.005) (0.686) (0.002) (0.766) (0.005) 
Hansen OIR (0.524) (0.639) (0.492) (0.658) (0.486) (0.773) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.510) (0.825) (0.231) (0.357) (0.492) (0.234) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.453) (0.418) (0.643) (0.745) (0.420) (0.942) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.615) (0.568) (0.733) (0.486) (0.716) (0.443) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.294) (0.601) (0.169) (0.930) (0.175) (1.000) 
       
Fisher  38.17*** 9614.00*** 49.77*** 11287.04*** 35.55*** 28146.35*** 
Instruments  18 30 18 30 18 30 
Countries  29 27 29 27 29 27 
Observations  95 81 95 81 95 81 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of 
marginal effects. 
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Table 3: Capital flight and economic governance  
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Regulation Quality  Government Effectiveness  Economic Governance 
       
Constant  3.242*** 4.717*** 4.113*** 5.237*** 3.164*** 3.480*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight (-1) 0.681*** 0.580*** 0.582*** 0.535*** 0.676*** 0.648*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Quality    0.378** 0.020 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.014) (0.728)     
Government Effectiveness  --- --- -0.120 -0.040 --- --- 
   (0.164) (0.585)   
Economic  Governance   --- --- --- --- 0.058 0.063* 
     (0.320) (0.054) 
Trade Openness  0.0007 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0009 
 (0.706) (0.702) (0.554) (0.828) (0.879) (0.494) 
GDP growth  -0.003 -0.016*** -0.00008 -0.019*** -0.002 -0.016*** 
 (0.589) (0.004) (0.992) (0.000) (0.701) (0.000) 
Inflation  --- 0.003*** --- 0.022*** --- 0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.020*** --- -0.019*** --- -0.020*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Public Investment --- -0.015 --- -0.022** --- -0.016 
  (0.161)  (0.047)  (0.101) 
       
AR(1) (0.116) (0.043) (0.143) (0.046) (0.118) (0.020) 
AR(2) (0.116) (0.565) (0.354) (0.623) (0.135) (0.247) 
Sargan OIR (0.263) (0.020) (0.697) (0.022) (0.408) (0.006) 
Hansen OIR (0.072) (0.631) (0.362) (0.762) (0.083) (0.607) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.298) (0.288) (0.263) (0.216) (0.379) (0.328) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.062) (0.771) (0.433) (0.944) (0.060) (0.708) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.492) (0.502) (0.623) (0.386) (0.297) (0.467) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.013) (0.782) (0.131) (1.000) (0.042) (0.816) 
       
Fisher  87.59*** 762694*** 55.60*** 216945*** 60.32*** 4297.55*** 
Instruments  18 30 18 30 18 30 
Countries  29 27 29 27 29 27 
Observations  95 81 95 81 95 81 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of 
marginal effects. 
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Table 4: Capital flight and institutional governance  
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Rule of Law   Corruption Control   Institutional  Governance 
       
Constant  3.470*** 4.717*** 3.956*** 4.308*** 3.550*** 4.817*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight (-1) 0.645*** 0.580*** 0.582*** 0.620*** 0.648*** 0.581*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law    -0.025 0.020 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.867) (0.728)     
Corruption Control   --- --- -0.408** -0.062 --- --- 
   (0.021) (0.392)   
Institutional Governance   --- --- --- --- -0.157** -0.036 
     (0.023) (0.304) 
Trade Openness  -0.0005 0.0006 -0.00007 0.001 -0.0004 0.001 
 (0.734) (0.702) (0.940) (0.184) (0.712) (0.216) 
GDP growth  0.002 -0.016*** -0.019** -0.024*** -0.012 -0.026*** 
 (0.693) (0.014) (0.045) (0.000) (0.147) (0.000) 
Inflation  --- 0.003*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.020*** --- -0.017*** --- -0.019*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Public Investment --- -0.015 --- -0.026* --- -0.032** 
  (0.161)  (0.051)  (0.015) 
       
AR(1) (0.161) (0.043) (0.057) (0.069) (0.077) (0.064) 
AR(2) (0.266) (0.565) (0.771) (0.780) (0.341) (0.936) 
Sargan OIR (0.718) (0.020) (0.770) (0.001) (0.724) (0.005) 
Hansen OIR (0.344) (0.631) (0.474) (0.663) (0.482) (0.773) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.193) (0.288) (0.160) (0.235) (0.259) (0.234) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.489) (0.771) (0.727) (0.852) (0.598) (0.942) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.426) (0.502) (0.418) (0.353) (0.708) (0.443) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.246) (0.782) (0.473) (1.000) (0.177) (1.000) 
       
Fisher  45.82*** 62694*** 43.88*** 7472.44*** 47.68*** 28146*** 
Instruments  18 30 18 30 18 30 
Countries  29 27 29 27 29 27 
Observations  95 81 95 81 95 81 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of 
marginal effects. 
 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
4.2.1 Contributions in the conception, definition and measurement of governance   
The practical contributions can be viewed from two perspectives, namely, the: insignificance 
of bundled governances and significance of bundled governance.  From the first viewpoint, 
we have established that whereas the role of political governance is not significant, the 
corresponding role of its constituent components (political stability and ‘voice & 
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accountability’) is significant at mitigating capital flight. It follows that the election and 
replacement of political leaders per se does not reduce capital flights.  There are two angles to 
the second perspective. On the one hand, economic governance increases capital flight 
whereas the effects of regulation quality and government effectiveness are not significant. On 
the other hand, corruption-control and institutional governance negatively affect capital flight 
whereas the impact of the rule of law is not significant.  
In the light of the above: (i) the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities affect capital flight while constituents of such formulation and 
implementation of polices do not and (ii) the effect on institutional governance on capital 
flight is driven by corruption-control. The above discourse clearly articulates the interest of 
these findings in terms of bundling and unbundling governance. In essence, it shows that a 
governance concept could:  behave differently from its constituents and be driven by specific 
constituent components. Having discussed the contribution of the study to the conception, 
definition and measurement of governance, we now engage the signs of estimated coefficients 
in terms of the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model and relevance of corruption-
control as the best governance tool in the fight against capital flight.  
 
4.2.2 The Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model in the fighting capital flight    
The findings can be further elucidated with differences in the two dominant models of 
development, namely:  the Washington Consensus (which prioritizes political governance) 
and the Beijing Model (which prioritizes economic governance). Priorities of the dominant 
development models build on Asongu and Ssozi (2016, p.44) who have surveyed about 110 
recently published studies on Sino-African relations to define the Beijing Model as “de-
emphasized democracy, state capitalism, and priority in economic rights” and the Washington 
Consensus as “liberal democracy, private capitalism, and priority in political rights”.   
 The emphasis on economic governance versus political governance is essential in 
capital flight for a fundamental reason. The two dominant models of development influence 
foreign investment and capital flows to African countries (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Lin,  & 
Farrell, 2013; Drogendijk & Blomkvist,  2013). Accordingly, whereas capital flows from 
Western countries (that are sympathetic to the Washington Consensus) is based on the 
economics of pre-conditions such as respect for human rights and improvements in 
democratic standards, capital flows from China (who champions the Beijing Model) is not 
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founded on the principle of conditionality, essentially because the country has a foreign policy 
of non-interference.  
 From our findings, it can broadly be established that priority in the Washington 
Consensus is more effective at fighting capital flight compared to the Beijing Model because 
whereas political governance (and/or constituents) negatively affect capital flight, and 
economic governance (and/or constituents) has the opposite effect.  
 
4.2.3 Corruption-control as the most effective governance weapon 
 In terms of significance and magnitude of significance of estimated coefficients, we 
have established that corruption-control is the most significant deterrent to capital flight. This 
is probably because it is the ‘end-game’, ‘last resort’ or ‘final phase’ in the fight against 
capital flight. Corruption-control as the best governance weapon has been confirmed in recent 
software piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013) and African conflicts/crimes (Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2016) literature. In essence: (i) leaders can be voted into office through quasi-
democratic mechanisms involving the majority of the population through vote-buying 
(political governance) and (ii) elected leaders could formulate legislative rules but overseeing 
citizens who are violating those rules substantially depends on the incorruptibility of 
government/public officers. Moreover, even the enforcement of rules by courts via sanctions 
on culprits who are caught in activities that are conducive to capital flight, are contingent on 
judges’ incorruptibility. Citizens may express themselves as they wish within a society. 
However, only in the absence of corruption can: (i) credible leaders be voted into offices, (ii) 
genuine laws adopted by the legislature, (iii) government officers credibly enforce laws 
passed by the legislature, (iv) law enforcement officials take embezzlers of public 
commodities to courts and (v) judges inflict appropriate sanctions on government officials 
violating the law (especially in terms of trade misinvoicing and transfer mispricing).  
 As a policy implication, the findings established in the inquiry indicate that capital 
flight in Africa can be brought under control if the fight against corruption is enhanced by the 
governments of sampled countries. Such efforts in corruption-control would go a long a way 
to improving the investment climate that is required for economic prosperity, equitable 
distribution of wealth and sustainable progress in the post-2015 development agenda.  
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5. Conclusion and future research directions 
 
This study has investigated the effect of governance on capital flight by bundling and 
unbundling governance. The empirical evidence is based on 37 African countries for the 
period 1996-2010 and the Generalised Method of Moments.  Governance is bundled by 
principal component analysis, namely: (i) political governance from political stability and 
‘voice and accountability’; (ii) economic governance from government effectiveness and 
regulation quality and (iii) institutional governance from corruption-control and the rule of 
law. The following findings are established.  (i) Political stability and ‘voice and 
accountability’ reduce capital flight while the effect of political governance is not significant. 
(ii) Economic governance increases capital flight whereas the effects of regulation quality and 
government effectiveness are not significant. (iii) Corruption-control and institutional 
governance negatively affect capital flight whereas the impact of the rule of law is not 
significant. (iv) Corruption-control is the most effective governance weapon in the fight 
against capital flight. (v) Priority in the Washington Consensus is more effective at fighting 
capital flight compared to the Beijing Model. Policy implications are discussed. 
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing if the established linkages 
withstand empirical scrutiny when conditional distributions of capital flight and governance 
are considered. In essence, articulating how initial levels in governance and capital flight 
affect established linkages is important because blanket capital flight policies based on mean 
values of dependent and independent variables may not be effective unless they are contingent 
on their initial levels.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurements) Sources 
    
Capital Flight Capf. Ln of Capital Flight (constant of 2010),  Ndikumana & 
Boyce (2012a) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political Governance  Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
Trade Openness   Trade  Export plus Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment Pub.I Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (three year averages from 1996-2010) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Capital flight (log) 10.073 0.763 6.871 11.704 137 
Political Stability -0.647 0.949 -2.908 1.188 185 
Voice & Accountability  -0.676 0.670 -1.850 0.915 185 
Political Governance  -0.067 1.272 -2.818 2.683 185 
Government Effectiveness  -0.629 0.579 -1.960 0.740 185 
Regulation Quality  -0.627 0.564 -2.123 0.742 185 
Economic Governance  0.191 1.221 -2.937 3.139 185 
Rule of Law -0.697 0.641 -2.070 0.706 185 
Control of Corruption  -0.564 0.568 -1.978 0.992 185 
Institutional Governance 0.058 1.313 -3.088 3.313 185 
Trade Openness   76.074 39.929 20.979 250.954 178 
GDP growth   4.435 3.530 -11.271 19.818 180 
Inflation  73.344 663.372 -45.112 8603.275 173 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows  3.930 5.299 -4.112 33.738 143 
Public Investment   7.265 3.778 0.361 19.961 165 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (Uniform sample size :102) 
                
Political governance Economic governance Institutional governance Control variables Capital  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov Trade GDPg Infl. FDI Pub.I Flight  
1.000 0.739 0.928 0.686 0.683 0.710 0.728 0.796 0.791 0.280 0.009 -0.229 0.004 0.420 -0.194 PS 
 1.000 0.936 0.748 0.735 0.769 0.726 0.773 0.778 0.023 -0.025 -0.160 -0.005 0.256 -0.013 VA 
  1.000 0.770 0.761 0.794 0.780 0.841 0.841 0.159 -0.008 -0.207 -0.0006 0.360 -0.109 Polgov 
   1.000 0.871 0.970 0.856 0.878 0.901 -0.010 0.012 -0.156 -0.145 0.270 0.201 GE 
    1.000 0.964 0.756 0.819 0.819 -0.028 -0.102 -0.264 -0.230 0.109 0.139 RQ 
     1.000 0.834 0.880 0.891 -0.019 -0.044 -0.215 -0.193 0.203 0.174 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.848 0.964 0.124 -0.051 -0.173 -0.060 0.292 -0.024 CC 
       1.000 0.957 0.068 -0.023 -0.221 -0.050 0.373 0.027 RL 
        1.000 0.101 -0.039 -0.204 -0.057 0.342 0.001 Instgov 
         1.000 -0.105 0.210 0.394 0.274 -0.142 Trade 
          1.000 0.122 0.061 0.222 0.097 GDPg 
           1.000 0.207 -0.054 0.223 Infl. 
            1.000 0.072 -0.040 FDI 
             1.000 -0.292 Pub. I 
              1.000 Cap. Flight  
                
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control.RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Trade: 
Trade Openness. GDPg: GDP growth. Infl: Inflation. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Pub.I: Public Investment. Cap. Flight: Capital 
Flight.  
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